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REPLY TO JUSTIN D’ARMS
1. INTRODUCTION
It was a pleasure to receive Justin D’Arms’ thoughtful com-
ments on Part I of Facts, Values, and Norms, and it will be a
challenge to reply. D’Arms calls first for clarification of my
view about how empirical theory bears on moral theory, and
then for an explanation of how the relationalist form of mor-
al realism I defend can avoid relativism.
2. NATURALISM AND MORAL THEORY
D’Arms does not doubt that the answers to questions about
the nature and authority of morality depend in some measure
on psychological and social facts – he accepts the method of
broad reflective equilibrium, which calls for compatibility
between moral theory and our best available empirical theo-
ries. He doubts, however, that fine-grained empirical consid-
erations – such as the specific character of purported
explanations involving moral properties – can contribute
much to the resolution of important issues in moral theory.
As a first step in responding, let me point to some influential
critiques of substantive positions in moral theory that appear
to depend upon rather definite claims about the explanation
of moral phenomena.
2.1. Epistemic Critiques
Many philosophers hold that an individual’s belief that p,
even if true and justified, will not constitute knowledge that p
Philosophical Studies (2005) 126:481–490  Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2319-0
unless the fact that p plays an appropriate role in explaining
it. More ambitiously, some philosophers have argued that all
legitimate reasoning, including reasoning in the moral sphere,
is a form of ‘‘inference to the best explanation.’’ Such doc-
trines have been used to criticize realism and objectivity in
ethics, by arguing that explanations adverting to moral facts
are always pre-empted by, or inferior to, explanations citing
only non-moral phenomena.1
2.2. Semantic Critiques
Mental or linguistic access to a domain of facts and proper-
ties, some philosophers claim, requires that these facts and
properties have exerted an appropriate shaping force on the
evolution of our thought and discourse. If this is right, then a
defense of morality against an error theory based on referen-
tial failure must provide a credible account of how moral
thought and language could track putative moral facts and
properties.2
2.3. Empirical Critiques
Recent work in psychology has called into question common-
sense and philosophical conceptions of moral judgment and
sentiment (see Haidt, 2001), rational agency (see Bargh and
Chartrand, 1999; Railton, 2004), traits of character (see
Doris, 2002; Vranas 2005; Sabini and Silver, 2005), the rela-
tion of moral judgment to motivation (see Roskies, 2003),
and the nature of subjective well-being and its place in the
psychology of motivation and action (see Kahneman et al.,
2004). It is too early to say whether the empirical theories
lying behind these particular challenges will stand the test of
time, but their message for moral theory is already plain: we
philosophers are not on such safe ground as we suppose in
treating broad reflective equilibrium as a relatively unde-
manding standard.3
To assess the force and purported implications of these cri-
tiques of substantive positions in moral theory, we have no
alternative but to investigate in some explanatory depth and
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detail the genesis and character of moral thought, language,
and practice. This claim would come as no surprise to Hume
or Nietzsche.
3. NATURALISM AND NORMATIVE ETHICS
Still, D’Arms is surely right that appeal to empirical consider-
ations can go only so far – we must connect with straightfor-
wardly normative questions. Elsewhere I have attempted to
make the case that naturalistic accounts of intrinsic value,
moral rightness, and moral value can sustain appropriate nor-
mative roles, at least up to a good approximation (see Rail-
ton, 1984, 1989, 1992). Rather than repeat those arguments
here, I would like to consider a particular way in which
empirical considerations matter even when we engage directly
in reflective normative judgment.
Let me follow D’Arms and discuss moral value. He
appears to find this concept serviceable enough, and is wor-
ried less about its meaning than its measure – or rather,
about what role empirical theory could play in establishing
which measure of moral value, if any, is correct. Is it morally
better to maximize overall good, or to distribute goods equal-
ly? Do all increases in well-being count in favor of an out-
come, or only those that satisfy needs? The resolution of such
questions is a straightforwardly normative matter, if any is.
How do we proceed with reflecting on such questions? Typ-
ically, we begin (where else?) by consulting our intuitive
moral judgments. We count as evidence for a normative view
that it fits our considered moral judgments, especially those
widely shared and highly confident. However, recent work in
cognitive social psychology and behavioral economics invites
us to reflect self-critically on the epistemic authority we nor-
mally accord to intuitive judgments. Framing effects, anchor-
ing effects, cognitive dissonance, heuristics, affect-priming,
and the like play an uncomfortably large role in explaining
our intuitive judgments. Merely by changing the mode of
description of a given choice situation, for example, experi-
menters can induce subjects to switch their intuitive
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judgments.4 So when we engage in reflective normative judg-
ment, we should add to the evidence of our normative intu-
itions whatever evidence we have about how intuitive
judgment works and how this can shape or color our reac-
tions in ways we do not deem morally relevant.
Consider then the choice mentioned above, between opti-
mific vs. need-based conceptions of moral value. In making
this choice, we reflect on what matters most to us. Given this
framing, it seems plausible enough to say that we are chiefly
concerned that our needs be met. And yet if we look at the
actual goods at stake, and at the psychological and historical
evidence concerning human motivation, a different picture
emerges. Individuals regularly forgo meeting needs in order
to advance other goals, often symbolic in nature, and some-
times at great risk to their lives. Moreover, a sizable body of
psychological literature indicates that we often hold mistaken
views about what we really want and how much we want it.
This is especially striking in the case of individual concep-
tions of what will make us happy.5 Such evidence, too, be-
longs with the intuitions upon which we reflect when asking
what really matters in life.
4. REALISM AND RELATIVISM
One ground for doubting whether the sort of naturalistic real-
ism I propose could afford a vindicatory explanation of moral
thought and practice is that it might turn out to be too sub-
jective or relativistic to capture the objective, universal pur-
port of moral judgment. D’Arms raises such an objection in
discussing an example I use to suggest that color properties do
not afford a good model for moral value, since (among other
things) color predicates appear to have their extension rigidi-
fied with respect to normal human color responses as they
actually are. Applied to the moral case, this could have the
result of projecting our actual, normal moral responses and
judgments into other possible worlds, including those where
individual psychology or the conditions of life are signifi-
cantly different. I see this as a parochialism contrary to the
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objectivity to which morality aspires, and defend instead a
functional relationalism that analogizes ‘good’ to functionally-
characterized concepts such as ‘‘sweet-tasting’’ or ‘‘nutritious’’.
D’Arms is unsure whether actual humans accord intrinsic
moral import to genetic kinship, as my own example sup-
poses, and so proposes an alternative example. Take it as
given that Present-Day Humans embrace optimific ethics – we
are disposed to see social outcomes as morally valuable strict-
ly as a function of net overall well-being. Future Humans, by
contrast, are assumed to embrace sufficiency ethics – they are
disposed to judge the moral value of outcomes strictly in
terms of whether basic needs are met. He then asks: Does my
relationalism commit me to the view that this change in mor-
al sensibilities makes it the case that questions of moral value
among New Humans are properly governed by sufficiency
ethics rather than optimific ethics?
I appear to face something of a dilemma. If I say ‘yes’, then
my relationalism would be at risk of becoming relativism. The
authoritative moral code for a society is too dependent upon
its own moral sensibilities.6 If, on the other hand, I say ‘no’,
then what would be the point of my original example? – After
all, it, too, involved a change in moral sensibilities.
My response depends upon the nature of the changes that
resulted in, or accompanied, the emergence of New Human
moral sensibilities. At least three possibilities are relevant. (1)
Changes in social life and individual psychology have altered
the features that explain why Present-Day Humans attribute
moral significance to issues about well-being beyond suffi-
ciency. (2) Social life and individual psychology remain lar-
gely unchanged, but empirical or philosophical discoveries
correct erroneous beliefs sustaining Present-Day Humanity’s
sense that differences in well-being beyond sufficiency have
moral relevance. (3) Social life, individual psychology, and
non-moral beliefs remain largely unchanged, except for the
changes of thought and feeling involved in the shift of moral
sensibilities itself.
Case (1) is closest to my original example. Unlike case
(2), that example does not attribute any mistake of fact or
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philosophy to those people who currently see genetic related-
ness as inherently morally relevant. And unlike case (3), my
example assumed significant changes in social practices and
individual psychological development, which in turn ex-
plained the changes in moral sensibility. Concocting examples
in which normative principles other than our own apply is no
easy matter. Some would say it is impossible, since a great
deal in the normative realm strikes us as necessary truth. My
hope was that intrinsic concern with genetic kinship was a
sufficiently self-standing component of current moral sensibil-
ities that a description of a society in which it does not have
inherent moral authority is at least prima facie intelligible.
My implicit model was the way in which spouses, and adop-
ted children and adoptive parents and siblings, can develop
deep mutual bonds and attitudes of special concern unrelated
to genetic kinship. The example simply generalized these
cases. The idea was that a shared ‘‘way of life’’ could emerge
in which the specific relationship of sharing DNA simply lost
any special significance in shaping how we grow up and age,
the identities we form, and the ties of unconditional affection
and concern we sustain.7
The difference between relationalism and the worrisome
sort of relativism mentioned above is thus easy to state: rela-
tionalism does not accord a society’s prevailing moral sensi-
bilities a society privileged status. But more plausible forms
of relativism permit a gap between a society’s actual norms
and the norms appropriate to it, much as informed preference
theory permits a gap between actual and authoritative prefer-
ences. How does my relationalism differ from such a view?
Relationalism holds that the appropriate morality for a
society depends upon its ways of life, the psyche and lived
experiences of its members, and the psychological, social, and
technical possibilities open to them.8 D’Arms’ example asks
us to imagine a society of New Humans who share our views
about well-being, but who differ markedly in moral sensibili-
ties. According to them, morality has nothing to say about
whether (for example) a wealthy parent ought to do more to
encourage his children’s aspirations and promote their
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well-being than to insure that their basic needs are met, or
whether the social distribution of well-being and goods above
the level of sufficiency should reflect individual contribution
and equal access. So dramatic a change in what counts as
morally relevant could only arise from very substantial chan-
ges in human motivational psychology, the importance to us
of our goals and aspirations, the character of our social rela-
tions, and the possible psychological, social, and technical
alternatives. If no such changes accompany the changed sen-
sibility, then I am not at all tempted to say that the New Hu-
man’s moral sensibility is appropriately regulative for them.
In making this claim, I am drawing upon the higher-order
Aristotelian principle according to which the proper regula-
tive principle for a thing depends upon the nature of that
thing (cf. Rawls 1971, 424 ff). I also draw upon characteris-
tics of the moral point of view and associated principles con-
cerning moral relevance and reasons. Does holding this much
fixed when considering other possible worlds betray a rigidity
that makes the analogy between moral judgment and color
judgment appropriate after all? My response in the original
paper was that the characteristics upon which I draw –
impartiality, generality, benevolence, treating like cases alike,
etc. – are not substantive moral principles but rather higher-
order principles constitutive of the moral point of view. To
use another helpful Rawlsian terminology, they belong to the
concept of morality rather than any particular normative or
meta-ethical conception of it – they are characteristics in vir-
tue of which judgments count as moral rather than, say, pru-
dential, politically expedient, epistemic, or aesthetic. I am not
free to alter these characteristics if I wish to provide an exam-
ple in which norms different from our own nonetheless strike
us as moral norms.9
At the same time, however, a would-be naturalist must be able
to explain how to account for such relatively a priori constitutive
principles within the constraints of an empirical theory. A breezy
answer can be given by gesturing toward a Quinean or Wittgen-
steinian account in terms of distinctive patterns of linguistic and
inferential use (e.g., relative immunity from revision; see
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Railton, 2001). But a fuller response calls for something no one
currently has, namely, a convincing account of the normativity
of meaning. Here the naturalist has the poor consolation that his
non-naturalistic competitors enjoy no advantage in the face of
this deep puzzle.
NOTES
1 For questions of explanatory pre-emption and supervenience in the
moral case, see Gibbard (2003). Harman (1996) makes quality of explana-
tion the lynchpin of his moral relativism. I discuss moral explanation and
address Harman’s view in Railton (1998).
2 See for example Boyd (1988) as well as the recent debate over ‘‘Moral
Twin Earth’’ (Horgan and Timmons, 1991).
3 John Rawls, for example, writes concerning constraints empirical theo-
ries of human nature might impose on normative theory:
... beyond the lessons of historical experience and such bits of wisdom as
not relying too much on scarce motives and abilities (say, altruism and
high intelligence), there is not much to go on. [Rawls (1993, p. 87)]
4 See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
5 See Gilbert et al. (2003).
6 An exception is Harman’s realist relativism (Harman, 1996).
7 It is worth noting that in various societies the notion of kin embraces
individuals without biological kinship, and that such symbolic kin rela-
tionships can take on primary importance in determining identity.
8 Compare Rawls’ discussion of the transition from the general to the
special conception of justice (Rawls 1971, 62f).
9 This, in itself, is not a normative claim on their behalf. Perhaps man-
kind has more reason in some global sense to pay attention to schmoral
norms than moral norms (‘‘schmoral norms’’ are like moral norms except
not benevolent).
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